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PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON REVIEW
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICITON OF APPELLATE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals retains exclusive jurisdiction to hear and rule on decisions of
the Utah Industrial Commission, with respect to decisions on Motions for Review before the
Industrial Commission under Section 35-1-86, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as revised and
amended, and also pursuant to Rule 3, 14, and 29, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF GROUNDS FOR SEEKING REVIEW OF ISSUES
The Petitioner alleges that because of the construction of Section 35-1-43(5), Utah Code
Annotated, as is presently interpreted in KOFOED V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, (Ct. App.,
1994), 872 P.2d 484, he has been left with no remedy for injuries sustained while working for
Utah Sovereign Lands and Forestry on or about September 22, 1994, while a prison inmate at
the Utah State Prison, thus violating the equal access to the courts provision of Article One,
Section Eleven of the Utah State Constitution, and his rights of due process.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES
ARTICLE ONE, SECTION ELEVEN, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION:
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due courtse of law, which shall be administered
without denial of unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or
defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil casue to which he is a
party."
SECTION 35-1-60, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED:
"The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy
against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer
imposed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability whatsoever, at common
law or otherwise, to the employee or to his spouse, heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or
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any other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way
contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because of or
arising out of his emplyment, and no action at law may be maintained against an employer or
against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or
death of an employee

"

SECTION 35-1-43(5), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED:
"As used in this chapter, 'employee,' 'worker1, or 'workman,' and 'operative' do not include
an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or 64-13-19, except as required by federal
statute or regulation."
SECTION 35-1-86, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED:
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any order of the
commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution of any order.
SECTION 64-13-16. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED:
"(1) Unless incapable of employment because of sickness or other infirmity or for
security reasons, the department may employ inmates to the degree that funding and available
resources allow.

An offender may not be employed on work which benefits any employee or

officer of the department.
(2) An offender employed under this section is not considered an employee, worker,
workman, or operative for purposes of Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation, except as
required by federal statute or regulation."
SECTION 64-13-19, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED:
"(1) The department shall determine the types of labor to be pursued, and what kind,
quality, and quantity of goods, materials, and supplies shall be produced, manufactured, or
repaired at correctional facilitites. Contracts may be made for the labor of offenders, including
contracts with any federal agency for a project affecting national defense. As many offenders as
practicable may be employed to produce, manufacture, or repair any goods, materials, or
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supplies for sale to thye state or its political subdivisions. Prices for all goods, materials, and
supplies shall be fixed by the department.
(2) An offender performing labor under this secition is not considered an emplyee,
worker, workman , or operative for purposes of Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation,
except as required by federal statute or regulation."
SECTION 63-30-10(18), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 AS REVISED:
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused
by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except
if the injury arises out of:

"

(18) the acivities of:
(b) fighting fire;...."
SECTION 63-46(b)-16, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS REVISED:
"As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
review all final agency action resulting from formal ajdudication proceedings...."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(A) NATURE OF THE CASE:
In this case the Petitioner seeks to have the Utah Court of Appeals find that the
ruling in KOFOED V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Ibid., is unconstitutional, at least as it relates
to work-related injuries sustained while an inmate, which require additional medical care
following one's release from prison, and which may require additional time off work or possibly a
resultant permanent partial impairment following release from prison. The KOFOED decision
appears to violate the open court's provision of Article One, Section Eleven of the Utah State
Constitution as it relates to the work-related injuries suffered by Mr. Skaar while still an inmate,
and those in similar situations to Mr. Skaar, who upon their release from prision have no
effective remedy for the ongoing resultant effects of those injuries sustained in prision
(B) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
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The Petitioner, DON BRENT SKAAR, while an inmate at the Utah State Prison, was
injured on or about September 22, 1994 while working on a fire detail as it was returning to the
State of Utah from the State of Idaho. He received some treatment for his injuries while at the
Utah State Prison, but when released, the prison refused further treatment. (Record, pgs. 8-9)
On or about June 13, 1995, the Petitioner, by and through his Counsel, DAVID K.
SMITH, ESQ., filed an Application for Hearing before the Industrial Commission of Utah, seeking
additional medical treatment, temporary total compensation benefits, and possible permanent
partial disability benefits, as are provided under Title 35, Utah Code Annotated. (Record, p.1)
(C) DISPOSITION OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah defended the State of Utah on the grounds
that Section 35-1-43(5) and the ruling in KOFOED vs. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Ibid.,
prohibited the Petitioner from any recovery from the State of Utah. (Record, pgs. 8-9)
On November 6, 1995 a hearing was held before the Administrative Law Judge at the
Industrial Commission of Utah, who ruled that VELARDE V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, (Utah
App., 1992), 831 P.2d 125 n.5 prevented the Administrative Law Judge from ruling on
constitutional issues; that such is the province of the Utah Court of Appeals. (Record, p. 12)
Further the ALJ ruled that KOFOED V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Ibid., appeared to
be controling in this case, and denied Petitioner any benefits, since he did not appear to fall
under the Workers' Compensation statutes. (Record, pgs. 12-13)
It should be noted that at the ALJ hearing level, issues relating to additional medical
benefits, temporary total disability benefit, and permanent partial disability benefits were never
addressed, since it was decided at the outset that the Industrial Commission lacked jurisdicition
to hear the claim in the first place. Hence, no testimony was taken and no records were received
at that hearing with respect to medical issues, lost time or other pertinent issues. (Record, pgs.
12-13)
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On November 10, 1996, within the thirty-day time period for filing, Petitioner filed a
Motion for Review before the Industrial Commission of Utah on the ALJ's decision of November
7, 1996. (Record, pgs. 14-18)
After a responsive pleading had been filed on behalf of the Defendants by the Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah objecting to the Petitioner's Motion for Reivew, (Record, pgs. 1922), the Industrial Commission ruled on April 2, 1996. It was noted that the material facts of the
case did not appear to be in dispute. The Commission further ruled that since it was well settled
that the Industrial Commission is not empowered to rule on constitutional issues before it, that it
had to uphold the fiinding of the ALJ, and thus ruled that Section 35-1-43(6) (sic.) was controlling
and prevented the Petitioner from any recovery in this case. The Petitioner's Motion for Review
was thus denied. (Record, pgs. 24-27)
On April 26, 1996 the Petitioner filed for a Petition for Writ of Review before the Utah
Court of Appeals challenging the constitutionality of Section 35-1-43(6), UCA as it applies to the
Petitioner's case. (Record, pgs. 29-30)
(D) STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
While a prisoner at the Utah State Prison, the Petitioner, DON BRENT SKAAR,
applied for and was accepted to work on a fire detail through a contract, entitled "Coperative
Agreement' between the Utah State Department of Corections and the Utah State Division of
Sovereign Lands and Forestry, Agreement Number 95-1399. (Record, p.1; Hearing, p. 45, lines
24-25; p. 7, lines 1-4).
Through cooperative arrangements with other states, including the State of
Idaho, prisoners on this detail were often shipped out of state to fight fires. (Hearing, p. 7, lines 510)
In the case at bar, the Petitioner was assigned with a fire team of six trucks to
fight a fire in Idaho. As the team was coming back to the State of Utah, the lead driver, Gary
Peck, himself a prisoner, and boss of the fire crew, took a rest area fast so that the truck behind
him was forced to slow down quickly. The vehicle in which the Petitioner was a passenger
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slowed from 50 miles per hour to about 10 miles per hour. The truck just behind the truck in
which the Petitioner was a driver locked his brakes, and hit the Petitioner's truck from behind.
The driver of that truck claimed later to have been going 40 to 45 mph when he hit the
Petitioner's truck.

As a result the Petitioner sustained injuries to his neck, left knee, right

shoulder, and felt numbess in hands. (Hearing, p. 46, lines 11-21)
The Petioner received some treatment at the Utah State Prison for his injuries, but upon
release from prison, continued to suffer symptoms from the accident in his neck, back and
shoulder and knee, requiring further medical care, and possibly consntituting some permanent
partial impairment. (Hearing, p. 46, lines 22-25; p. 47, lines 1-5)
The Petitioner subsequently applied to the prison for further treatment, but was denied
any further treatment, since they claimed no liability for treatment once he was released.
(Record, pgs. 8-9)
The Petitioner then filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, but was denied any
and all potential benefits becuase of the ruling in KOFOED V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION,
Ibid. (Record, p. 1, and Record pgs. 12-13)
The Petitioner has appealed the decision of the Industrial Commission denying him
benefits because he believes his constituional rights have been violated in that he claims to have
sustained serious injuries, which were incurred because of the negligence of others, and which
require additional treatment, and which may permanently partially impair him for life, but for
which he has been denied any redress before any agencies or courts of this state. (Record, pgs.
29-30)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Petitioner argues that he has been denied any redress before any of the courts of
the State of Utah, or before any administrative agency in the State of Utah, to seek recovery
from injuries sustained by him while working for the Utah Sovereign Lands and Forestry under a
cooperative agreement with the Utah State Department of Corrections, following release from
prision. He claims he sustained injuries which required additional medical treatment following his
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release from prision, and was unable to work as a result of those injuries following his release
from prison, and may have sustained permanent partial impairment from those injuries, but has
been denied access to any of the courts or to the Industrial Commission as a result of Section
35-1-43(5), UCA. He claims the injuries were caused by the negligence of a fellow employee
while working for Utah Sovereign Lands and Forestry, and were not caused by any negligence of
his own. (Hearing, p. 46, lines 2-21)
ARGUMNENT
Standard of Review:

Because the Industrial Commission is not a court of general

jurisdiction, it lacks authority to address the constutionality of any statute. VELARDE V. BOARD
OF REVIEW, Ibid.
The Utah Administraive Procedures Act allows this court to grant relief where the
Industrial Commission "has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Utah Code Ann., Section
63-16(4)(d) (1989), or where "the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is
unconstitutional on its face or as applied." Utah Code Ann., Section 63-46(b)-16(4)(a), (1989).
Since there does not appear to be any grant of discretion to the Commission in applying the
particular facts to Section 35-1-43(5), the Utah Court of Appeals is to use the "correction of error"
standard on review. AVIS V- BOARD OF REVIEW, (Ct. App., 1992), 194 Adv. Rep. 57, at 5758.
Argument: Section 35-1-43, which was amended in 1993 by Section (5) to provide that
the worker's compensation laws explicitly excluded inmates from the definition of "employee"
except as required by federal statute from the application of worker's compensation laws. This
Court has previously determined that this amendment was not a "clarification" of previous
decisions on this issue of whether inmates were

included or excluded from the workers

compensation statutes; rather, this Court held that the only plausible reading of the statute prior
to the 1993 amendment was that Legislature never intended inmates to be covered under the
definition of "employees" for workers compensation purposes.
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This Court in KOFOED ruled that since workers compensation laws were enacted to
provide financial security to injured employees during a time of disability, the act had no
application to inmates since their right for medical treatment or financial security does not
change with the occurrence of a disability. They are, after all, housed in a jail or prision, and all
their needs, including medical needs and housing are supplied.
The problem with the KOFOED decision, is that is does not supply us with the answer to
the question of who will provide financial security to an inmate who is seriously injured in an "on
the job" type injury while in prison, whether caused through no fault of his own, or not, and
following his release from prision, is still disabled or is still in need of medical treatment, or
whose abiliity to engage in gainful employment has been altered by the injury while an inmate.
Sections 63-46b-16(4)(a) and 63-16-(4)(d), contemplates that inmates will be provided
jobs whenever practicable, and feasible, given bugetary and security limitations. Inmates may
work at jobs both inside and outside of the prision or jails, and surely one should contemplate
that work-related injuries are likely to occur within the inmate population as they do in the
workforce in general. To deny them benefits which may be financially devastating once they are
released from prision. Simply because they were inmates when the accident occurred not only
seems to be a form of "cruel and unusual" punishment, and certainly denies them access to the
court system to seek recovery for those potential financially devastating injuries.
Logically, one could argue that if a person is not considered an employee for worker's
compensation law in the State of Utah, he is therefore not considered bound to the sole recovery
provisions of that act.
If that be so, then the common law doctrine of negligence would provide the injured party
an opportunity to seek relief before the Courts of Utah. The problem in this case with the use of
the common law of negligence is that this Petitioner is probitited under the

Governmental

Immunity Action (Section 63-30-10(18), UCA from bringing an action either against the State of
Utah, the Utah State Department of Corrections, or the Utah State Divisions of Sovereign Lands
and Forestry for either negligence caused by the State or any of its political arms or the states or
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against their agents or employees, under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

In this case the

Petitoner has been found to have been engaging in fire suppression activities in Idaho when he
was injured. (Record, p. 12)
Utah's open court's provision guarantees a person access to the courts "for an injury
done to him in his person, property or reputation. Utah Constituion, Article 1, Section 11. A
person is apparently considered protected under this Article of the Constitution if the statute
provides a person with a reasonable alternative remedy "by due course of law" for vindiction of
his constitutional interest. "(I)f there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided, abrogation
of the remedy...may be justified only if there is a clear social or economic eveil to be eliminated."
BERRY v. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP. (Utah, 1995) 717 P.2nd 670, 672.

See also,

WROLSTAD V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, (Utah App., 1992), 786 P.2d, 243.
In the case at bar, this author has not found any reasonable remedy which the Petitioner
might pursue, granted by due course of law. It would further seem that having been an inmate
when the work-related injury occurs is insufficient justification to deny him of his constitutioinal
rights as set forth in Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution. There is no clear social
or economic evil to be eliminated by denying such a person of a right to recover for injuries that
each other citizen presently enjoys.

Unless the law provides an "effective and reasonalbe

alternative remedy this statute as is relates to the Petitioner is unconstitutional. HALES V. THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, (Utah App., 1993) 21 Utah Adv. Rep. 51. It appears
that the leglistature has effectively closed the door to any right of the Petitioner, and others
similarly situated, to any recovery.
CONSLUSION
The Petitioner claims that Section 35-1-43(5) should be found to be unconstititonal as
violating Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah State Constitution as it relates to the facts of this case.
The Petitioner claims he should have a right to make a claim for workers compensation benefits
following his release from prison for work-related injuries sustained while in prison if the results
of those injuries on ongoing. The Petitioner claims that he should be afforded a hearing before
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the Utah State Industrial Commission on whether (a) he sustained a compensable work-related
injury while in the scope and course of his employment while an inmate,

(b) whether he is

entitled for additional medical benefits following his release from pnsion, (c) whether upon his
release from prison he is entitled to temporary total disability if he is found to be unable to work
because of the prison work-related accident, and (d) whether he is entitled to any permanent
partial disability award for any permanent injuries sustained on the job.
DATED this A )

day of December, 1996.

_-•»

- ^ v
o'

WID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Attorney for Petitoner
DON BRENT SKAAR
6925 Union Park Center, #600
Midvale, UT 84047
Telephone: (801) 566-3373
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF
PETITIONER ON REVIEW to Counsel for the Plaintiff this T^
addressed as follows:
MARK SHAW, ESQ.
Attorney at Law
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
392 East 6400 South
Murray, Utah 84107

DLVUDavid K. Smith, EQS.
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day of December, 1996,
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APPLICATION FOR HEARING

ien Name and/or OtherName(s) Used by Employee
4i

•Industrial Accident Claims Only4
rtoyer's Street Address
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<fcfc/7

friSc^l

^/fe/g-

, State and
an$ Zip Code
Cc

fNOTE: Three (3) copies of this form, including all
supporting documentation, must be submitted when
this fonn is filed with the Industrial Commission.]

*

L*-~Sf r

4i

*

)loyer's Insurance Carrier

PLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 35:
I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and inihe course of employment with the Employer on
<^7 ^
at the following location: /<c^^/2^L^^^
C~-> TTi&x^,*
The accide
accident
The

'J/J%u**A~^
as follows: L.^At
4*^4*
U^L

*

PlJ^cJ^^
The injuries I sustained,are:
_,.
<<r*j

/-*--/+

dk

The injury caused time off work from y ^ Z ' ^ d -

.
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/t+t/e^

sfyjzAf~

v^f
T

J C ^ C - L ^ £ ^ ,

—x

to

^5~~

- ^

;and

I claim: [Mark an X in the appropriate space(s) and attach supporting documentation for each item marked - see reverse]
A. V
B. \/
C.
D._vL

Medical Expenses
Recommended Medical Care
Higher Weekly Rate
Temporary Total Compensation

E.
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Temporary Partial Compensation I. v^ Interest
Permanent Partial Compensation J. s/ Other(Specify)
Permanent Total Compensation
AvAs.
Travel Expenses
Vt* VW> &
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re * ^

My date of birth is Tf^Jp *7, £&&*'
At the time of injury my wage was $_c*> *s— .P«" A^*^-; and I was
working fr~€> '
hours^per week. Also, I was/was not married and had
~
m dependent children under age
XL
18 when I was injured.
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages.]
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17^
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Employee
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Signature of Employee j

/?

Street A
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set Address of Attorney for Employee
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^22
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s
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Employee's Telephone Number and Social Security Number

UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM
WILL BE FILED BUT RETURNED FOR COMPLETION
r ry~,r

wcv

Workers
Compensation
Fund of Utah

Safe and Sound

July 26, 1995

Marjorie Mele, Clerk
Legal Division
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84151-0910
RE:

Claimant:
File No.:
Inj Date:
Employer:
Case No.:

Don Brent Skaar
95-17677
9-22-94
Sovereign Lands & Forestry
95-556

Dear Ms. Mele:
Our office is in receipt of an Application for Hearing filed by David K. Smith, Attorney, on behalf of the
above-named Applicant.
On September 22, 1994, the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah was the workers' compensation
insurance carrier for the State of Utah, Department of Corrections. To date, no benefits have been paid
on this claim.
The Defendantsfirstnotice of this claim was in the form of the Application for Hearing. There has been
no initial investigation performed, nor any denial or acceptance of benefits issued.
Defendants request that the Application for Hearing be dismissed. The Applicant failed to notify the
Defendants of his claim within 180 days. In addition, the Applicant is not entitled to any workers'
compensation benefits since he was an inmate of the Utah State Prison at the time of the injury.
According to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-43(5), the Applicant would be precluded from any
benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act since the definition of an employee does not include an
offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or Section 64-13-19. See also Kofoed vs. Industrial
Commission. 872 P.2d 484 (1994).

392 East 6400 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 Phone (801) 288-8000

Thinking

Please contact me if you need any additional information.
Respectfully,

WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH

CTT:sb
cc:

David K. Smith, 6925 Union Park Center, #600, Midvale, UT 84047
Sovereign Lands & Forestry, Utah State Prison, Draper, UT 84020
Alaris Dillon

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 95556
DON BRENT SKAAR,
Applicant,
*
*

v.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS and/or THE
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF
UTAH,
Defendants.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East 300
South, Salt Lake City, Utah on 6 November, 1995, at 10:00 a.m.
The hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was not present since he is currently
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, but was represented by
David K. Smith, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were represented by Carrie T. Taylor, Attorney
at Law.

By prior stipulation, the hearing time was used to present oral argument
on the defendants' Motion to Dismiss made in their answer dated July 26,.
1995. Oral argument was made by each party and written evidence submitted.
At the conclusion of the hearing the case was considered ready for order and a
ruling was made from the bench which contained the following
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

In September, 1994, the applicant, a Utah State Prison inmate, pursuant
to an agreement between the Utah State Department of Corrections and the
Utah State Division of Sovereign Land and Forestry, voluntarily performed
fire suppression activities in Idaho. In the latter part of September,
after performing such activities, the applicant was involved in a motor
vehicle accident on his way back to the prison. As a result of this
accident, the applicant is alleging certain injuries and seeking benefits
under the Workers' Compensation Act.

2.

The relevant facts and circumstances involved in this case mirror those
found in Kofoed v. Ind. Comm'n, 872 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1994).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1.

Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-43 (5), which became effective May,
1993, applies to this case and provides:
As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and
"operative" do not include an offender performing labor under
Section 64-13-16 or 64-13-19, except as required by federal statute
or regulation.
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2.

The applicant as "an offender performing labor," is not an employee for
Utah workers compensation purposes. No evidence regarding a federal
statute or regulation was offered which would suggest that the applicant
fell within a federal exception.

ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim of the applicant be, and the same is
hereby, dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing shall
be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying in
detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so filed, this Order
shall be final and not subject to further review or appeal. In the event a
Motion for Review is timely filed, the opposing parties shall have fifteen
(15) days from the date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a
written response with the Commission in accordance with Section 6346b-12(2), Utah Code Annotated.
DATED this

/

day of / ^ ^ ^ l y ^ ^ ^

, 1995

<V053

DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Utah State Bar #2993
Attorney for Applicant
DON BRENT SKAAR
Suite 600
6925 Union Park Center
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 566-3373

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DON BRENT SKAAR,
|

MOTION FOR REVIEW

)

Case No. 95556

Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS, and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND
OF UTAH,

]
]

Defendants.

COMES NOW

the

Applicant, DON BRENT SKAAR, and Move

the Industrial Commission of Utah for Review of the Order of
Dismissal entered in the above-captioned

proceedings

on or

about November 10, 1995.
This motion is based upon the following:
1.

The administrative

1

law

judge

found

that

the

applicant was an inmate at the Utah State Prison at the time
of his injury.
2.
found
1993

As a

consequence,

the administrative law judge

that Section 35-1-43(5), which became effective
applied

in

this

case,

and

the

Defendant

is

May,
not

considered an "employee" for workers compensation purposes.
3.

As a

result,

the Applicant was found not to be

entitled to any workers1 compensation benefits.
4.

Applicant

claims that Section 35-1-43 Utah Code

Annotated, operates to prevent him from access to the courts
in

violation

of

Article

One,

Section Eleven of the Utah

State Constitution.
5.
injured

It is

Mr.

Skaar's position that because he was

on the job as a fire fighter, caused by the neglect

of a co-worker (inmate), he sustained an injury for which he
is

without

a remedy.

He cannot bring an action under

workers1 compensation statutues

since

the

he is not considered

an employee within the meaning of the statute.
6.

While he received some medical attention for his

injuries while in prison, upon release, he was on his own to
seek medical attention which was the fault of another.
7.

He cannot

bring

an action against the State of

Utah, which is protected under the doctrine
2

of governmental

immunity,

and

he

cannot

bring

a

worker's

compensation

action, though it is considered the sole source of

recourse

for industrial injuries because of Section 35-1-43, UCA.
8.
medical

care,

inmate's
related
not

Although
it

the
does

prison

offers

not provide

its

inmates free

compensation

for

temporary total disability as a result of a

an

work-

accident once his is released from prison, and does

provide

compensation for permanent partial disability,

if there is a permanent partial disability rating.
9.
provide
people

an

Because the Utah State Legislature has failed to
effective and reasonable alternative remedy for

such as Mr. Skaar in lieu

or

Benefits, Section 35-1-43, UCA must
Open

Workers

be found to violate the

Courts provisions of the Utah State

should

be

found unconstitutional.

v. The Industrial Commission, (Utah

Compensation

Consitution,

See for example:
Ct.

App.,

1993),

and
Hales
211

Utah. Adv. Rep. 51; Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, (Utah
Ct.

App.,

1990)

786

P.2nd

243; Velarde

v.

Commission, (Utah App. Ct., 1992) 832 P.2nd. 123.
DATED this / ^\ day of November, 1995.
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Industrial

K

n

.

OAVlb 11. lSMlTSfr-ESQ.
Attorney for Applicant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby
copy

of

this 1Q

the

certify

foregoing

that

I mailed a true and correct

Motion for Review to the following

day of November, 1995:

Industrial Commission of Utah
Adjudication Division
Heber M. Wells Office Building
Third Floor
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
Carrie Taylor
Legal Department
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah
392 East 6400 South
Murray, UT 84107
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ,

CARRIE T. TAYLOR, 6045
Attorney for Defendants
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 288-8149

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 95-556

Don Brent Skaar
Applicant,
v
*
*
Sovereign Lands & Forestry
and/or
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF
UTAH,

DEFENDANTS1 RESPONSE TO MOTION
FOR REVIEW

*
*

Defendants.

Defendants, by and through counsel, Carrie T. Taylor, hereby respond to Applicant's Motion
for Review as follows:
I. Applicant's constitutional claim should be addressed to the Utah Court of Appeals.
The Utah Court of Appeals, not the Industrial Commission, is the appropriate forum to
address the Applicant's constitutional concerns. The Industrial Commission, because of its limited
scope ofjurisdiction, defers to the Utah Court of Appeals for constitutional analysis. In Velarde v

C< v: J

Industrial Commission. 831 P.2d 123, 125 n.5 (Utah App. 1992), the Administrative Law Judge
stated:
It is beyond the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission to rule on the
applicant's constitutional claims in this matter. The Industrial Commission is
not a forum of general jurisdiction, and accordingly, cannot interpret
constitutional provisions. Rather, that task must be undertaken by the Utah
Court of Appeals.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act allows the Court of Appeals to grant relief to
petitioners who have been substantially prejudiced because "the agency action, or the statute or rule
on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied." Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4)(a). Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law which is reviewed de novo
by the Utah Court of Appeals. See Velarde. 831 P.2d at 125. Because the Commission's conclusions
regarding the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-43(5) will not be afforded any
deference by the Court of Appeals, Defendants request that the ALJ's Order be affirmed and
Applicant's Motion for Review denied.
II. Applicant has not met his burden of proof.
Even if Applicant were considered an employee for workers compensation purposes, his
claims should still be dismissed because he has failed to support them by a preponderance of evidence.
On the Application for Hearing, Applicant requested medical expenses, recommended medical care,
temporary total compensation, permanent partial compensation and travel expenses.
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A review of Applicant's medical records reveals that he was provided all recommended
medical care at the prison infirmary and was not placed on any physical restrictions after the alleged
accident. Defendants are unable to locate any references to time off work, impairment ratings or
travel expenses Furthermore, Applicant has failed to indicate what medical records or other evidence
support his claims. On the contrary, an Emergency Fire-fighter Time Report indicates that Applicant
returned to his regular volunteer duties after the alleged injury (See Attachment 1).
Conclusion
The Utah Court of Appeals is the proper forum for Applicant's constitutional issues.
Furthermore, even if Applicant's employment status or the constitutionality of Utah Code Annotated
section 35-1-43(5) were not at issue here, his claims must nonetheless be dismissed because they have
not been plead with specificity or supported by a preponderance of the evidence Based upon the
foregoing, Defendants request that Applicant's Motion for Review be denied.
DATED thks?/ day of November, 1995.

CARRIE T. T A Y L O R , 7 /
Attorney for Defendants
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
DON BRENT SKAAR,
*
*

Applicant,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH# DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, and THE WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
Defendants.

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
*
*

*

Case No. 95-0556

*
*

Don Brent Skaar asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to
review the Administrative Law Judge's denial of Mr. Skaar's claim
for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over
this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW
Does §35-1-43(6) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act deny
Mr. Skaar his right of access to Utah's courts, in violation of
Article One, §11, Constitution of Utah.
FINDINGS OF FACT
As material to the issue presented in Mr. Skaar's motion for
review, the facts of this case are not in dispute and may be
summarized as follows:
During late September 1994, Mr. Skaar was an inmate of the
Utah State Prison. Pursuant to §64-13-16 and §64-13-19, Utah Code
Ann., Mr. Skaar was engaged in fire suppression activities. In
connection with such activities, he alleges he was involved in a
work related accident that resulted in injuries for which he now
seeks workers' compensation benefits.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
DON BRENT SKAAR
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The ALJ's decision concluded that §35-1-43(6) of the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act prevents Mr. Skaar from obtaining
workers' compensation benefits for injuries suffered while working
as a prison inmate.
Mr. Skaar does not challenge the ALJ's
interpretation of §35-1-43(6), but argues the statute is
unconstitutional as a violation of the "open courts" provision of
Article One, §11 of the Constitution of Utah.
It is well settled that the Industrial Commission is not
empowered to adjudicate constitutional questions and must,
therefore, presume that statutes are constitutional. That being
the case, the Industrial Commission affirms the ALJ's determination
in this matter. Mr. Skaar may petition the Utah Court of Appeals
for judicial review of the constitutional issue he has raised in
this proceeding.
ORDER
The Industrial Commission of Utah affirms the decision of the
ALJ and denies Mr. Skaar's motion for review. It is so ordered.
DATED this ^ .
day of April, 1996.

A
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CONCURRING AND SEPARATE OPINION
I concur with the opinion of my colleagues. However, I write
this separate opinion to protest and articulate umbrage with the
law as expressed in Kofoed v. Ind. Comm'n, 872 P.2d 484 (Utah App.
1994) and in Section 35-1-43(6) of the Workers' Compensation Act.
To place an inmate of the statef s prison system in a voluntary work
situation outside of what most people consider to be the
confinement routines expected of prisoners, to pay the inmate for
the work, and then for the inmate to suffer an injury for which
some degree of workers' compensation
is not paid
seems
unconscionable and a dereliction of the societal duty expected from
the workers' compensation system.
It may be that the workers'
compensation system should establish different standards for
inmates and former inmates. Surely truly severe injuries that a
former inmate might bear the rest of his life would inhibit his
chance to otherwise resurrect a normal life. I would expect that
the burden of trying to create a normal existence for a former
inmate must be difficult at best.
A severe and significantly
limiting injury overlaying the regular problems could be an undue
burden forcing that person to become an object of charity or a
candidate for reincarceration - each being the human wastage
desired to be eliminated through workers' compensation.

mi*)

Thomas R. Carlson
Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this
Order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial
Commission
within
2 0 days
of
the date
of
this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0
days of the date of this order.

to
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion
For Review in the matter of Don Brent Skaar, Case No. 95-0556, was
mailed first class postage prepaid this 1
day of April, 1996,
to the following:
Don Brent Skaar
21 I Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103
David Smith
Attorney at Law
6925 Union Park Center, #600
Midvale, Utah 84 04 7
Carrie Taylor
Attorney at Law
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Adell Bifcler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah
orders\95-0556

ORIGINAL
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Utah State Bar No. 2993
Attorney for Petitioner
DON BRENT SKAAR
Suite 600
6925 Union Park Center
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 566-3373
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BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DON BRENT SKAAR,
Petitioner,

]

vs.

]|

STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, and THE WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,

]

PETITION FOR WRIT
OF REVIEW
Case No. 95-0556

]

Respondents,

1.

Petitioner,

DON

BRENT

DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ., petitions the

SKAAR, through Counsel,
Utah

Court

of Appeals

for a Writ of Review directing the Respondent to certify its
entire

record,

which

shall include all of the proceedings

and evidence taken in this matter, to this Court.
2.

This Petition seeks review of the entire order.

DATED this ~>l\) day of April, 1996.

1

LO^-J

u^

DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby

certify

that

I mailed a true and correct

copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW to Counsel
for

the Respondents this xb

day of April, 1996, addressed

as follows:

Commissioner Stephen M. Hadley, Chairman
Colleen S. Colton, Commissioner
Thomas R. Carlson, Commissioner
Utah State Industrial Commission
Heber M. Wells Office Building, 3rd Floor
160 East 300 South
P.O. BOX 146615
Salt Lake city, UT 84114-6615
CARRIE TAYLOR W ^ >
Attorney at Law
The Workers' Compensation Fund of^UTah
392 East 6400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
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1

situation exists here with Mr. Skaar.

He also was on

2

his way to perform services in fighting a fire, was in

3

Idaho, was involved in a minor, very minor automobile

4

accident, in which he's now basing his claim.

5

Basically, I can't see anything that distinguishes the

6

Kofoed case from the current case, and in addition to

7

the Kofoed case precedent, the Legislature has amended

8

35-1-43 under subparagraph 5 to specifically exclude

9

any offender performing labor under other sections of

10

the Code would be —

would not be considered an

11

employee or worker for purposes of Workers

12

Compensation.

13

support we're relying on for our Motion to Dismiss.

And I think that basically that's the

14

THE COURT:

Okay.

15

MR. SMITH:

Ms. Taylor is right when she says

16

that this case fairly well mirrors the Kofoed case.

17

I may, I'd just like to at least proffer what —

18

the initial —

19

case, just again by way of proffer.

20

inmate at the Utah State Prison at the time he was

21

injured.

22

volunteer basis, were permitted to fight fires outside

23

of the prison, as in the Kofoed case.

24
25

If

what

what I believe the facts are in this
My client was an

He was -- Certain of the inmates were, on a

And in connection with that, the Department of
Corrections enters into —

or entered into an agreement

with the Utah State Division of Sovereign lands and
forestry, and I have a copy of that agreement here, and
perhaps it ought to be submitted for purposes of
of —

—

of -- of examination at least.
And the •— And the idea is that —

or the

intent is that the prison inmates then would be outside
of the prison for a period of months actually, and
would fight fires not only in the state of Utah, but
outside of the state of Utah where needed.

It could be

in Montana or Idaho or Wyoming.
In this particular instance, my client was on
a team, a firefighter team, and they were coming back
to Salt Lake City, but were in Idaho at the time, and
they —

they were in six trucks and they went rather

quickly into a truck rest area, and one of the trucks,
which was a fire fighting truck with another crew,
was —

came in rather quickly behind the truck that my

client was a passenger in, and they were rearended.

My

client estimates his truck was going about ten miles an
hour, and the truck that rearended him at the time was
going about forty miles an hour.
As a result, he injured himself, injured his
left knee, his right shoulder, numbness in his hands,
some neck and back injuries and shoulder injuries and
knee injury.

Since that time, my client claims that he

*" *OCG

received little if any treatment at the prison for
those injuries.

Since that time he has been released

from prison, continues to have ongoing neck and back
problems, for which he's been unable to get treatment
because -- primarily because he can't afford it.
And then recently, within the last couple of
months, he was

—

I guess was involved in a probation

violation which has sent him back to prison for another
six months apparently.
is —

At least that's -- the word

that's the word he gives to me.
Your Honor, from what I understand the law to

be, with the amendment of 35-1-43, which I think
codifies what Kofoed —

the Kofoed court was

suggesting, saying that inmates are not employees.
you follow that case, and I —

If

I think your bound to

follow the case, then you would have to find that my
client is not and was not an employee.
And I'm not sure that —

that —

Administrative Law Judge you can —
that was unconstitutional, but —
unconstitutional.

that as an

you can find that

but I think it is

It's unconstitutional primarily

because it violates the open court section of the
constitution, Article -- Article 1, Section 11.

And

Article 1, Section 11 says that all courts shall be
open, and every person for an injury done to him or in
8

1 >. c
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